We present a sufficient condition for a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of a stochastic differential game on an infinite horizon. This condition gives rise to a system of elliptic partial differential equations involving a static Stackelberg game at the level of Lagrangian. As an example, we...

This paper introduces the notion of mixed leadership in non-zero-sum differential games, where there is no fixed hierarchy in decision making with respect to the players. Whether a particular player is leader or follower depends on the instrument variable s/he is controlling, and it is possible...

For stochastic Stackelberg differential games played by a leader and a follower, there are several solution concepts in terms of the players' information sets. In this paper we derive the maximum principle for the leader's global Stackelberg solution under the adapted closed-loop memoryless...

This paper is concerned with open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of two-player linear-quadratic differential games with mixed leadership. We prove that, under some appropriate assumptions on the coefficients, there exists a unique Stackelberg solution to such a differential game. Moreover, by means...

In this paper we characterize the feedback equilibrium of a general infinite-horizon Stackelberg-Nash differential game where the roles of the players are mixed. By mixed we mean that one player is a leader on some decisions and a follower on other decisions. We prove a verification theorem that...

We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on an e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening...