This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule...

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs)...

We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents...

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated...

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition...

This paper examines how neutral the current EU decision-making procedures are to membership and how well they obey certain transparent general constitutional principles. The paper evaluates the performance of the procedures by strategic and classical power indices. The main emphasis in the...

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...