One's own emotions may influence someone else's behavior in a social interaction. If one believes this, s/he has an incentive to game emotions-to strategically modify the expression of a current emotional state-in an attempt to influence her/his counterpart. In a series of three experiments,...

This paper describes a parametric approach to weakening rationality assumptions in game theory to fit empirical data better. The central features of game theory are: The concept of a game (players, strategies, information, timing, outcomes); strategic thinking; mutual consistency of beliefs and...

Much of experimental research in marketing has focused on individual choices. Yet in many contexts, the outcomes of one’s choices depend on the choices of others. Furthermore, the results obtained in individual decision making context may not be applicable to these strategic choices. In this...

The trust building process is basic to social science. We investigate it in a laboratory setting using a novel multi-stage trust game where social gains are achieved if players trust each other in each stage. And in each stage, players have an opportunity to appropriate these gains or be...

Backward induction is a widely accepted principle for predicting behavior in sequential games. In the classic example of the "centipede game'', however, players frequently violate this principle. An alternative is a dynamic level-k model, where players choose a rule from a rule hierarchy. The...

Experiments typically rely on small payments to incentivize participants. This works if participants view these payments as fungible with their own money, but if participants view the payments as a windfall, they may behave differently in experiments than in real life. We modify standard risky...