Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players' (common) prior on the network in a setting where...

We provide an overview and synthesis of the literature on how social networks influence behaviors, with a focus on diffusion. We discuss some highlights from the empirical literature on the impact of networks on behaviors and diffusion. We also discuss some of the more prominent models of...

This paper analyses a simultaneous game of network formation and information acquisition where the benefit structure is such that the benefit that an agent derives from the network she is located in depends on the maximum information that someone in her neighbourhood, including herself,...

We study a coordination game among agents on a network, who choose whether or not to take an action in an uncertain environment that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. We develop an algorithm that fully characterizes the equilibrium partitions (coordination sets) and thresholds...

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic...

We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very general point. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that agents' utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not...

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic...

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict...