We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by learning from past behavior of others and then best respond to these beliefs looking k periods ahead. We...

We analyze tournaments of heterogeneous players from an organizer's perspective. Using a simple model of a noisy tournament, we demonstrate how the likelihood of selecting the best player, here termed the "predictive power" of a tournament, depends on the tournament format, the distribution of...

This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...

We experimentally test the ability of subjects to identify repeated-game strategies from prisoner's dilemma choice data. In the experiments, subjects use a finite state grammar to build models to fit game histories. The histories are designed to distinguish between strategies with empirical and...

This paper looks to see if subjects approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games featuring discounted payoffs with an option to opt out differently from how they approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that are randomly terminated. I show under relatively...

The dynamics generated by individual learning mechanisms in evolutionary games rely upon the relationship between imitation and experimentation. We consider the dynamics created by individuals who learn through a process of selective imitation, for a general class of sequential, symmetric,...

We experimentally study behavior in a common property renewable resource extraction game with multiple equilibria. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract and consume a renewable resource in continuous time. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with...

An elimination tournament matches players pairwise and promotes the winners to a subsequent round where the procedure is repeated. In the presence of idiosyncratic noise the tournament turns into a probabilistic mechanism that reveals the ranking of players imperfectly. I assess theoretically...

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ...

We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn `across games' by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent's individual solution concept is represented by a...