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Equilibrium behavior in the conservation easement game

Anderson, Christopher M.; King, Jonathan R. - In: Land economics : applied research on environmental resources 80 (2004) 3, pp. 355-374

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002159930

Ambiguity aversion in multi-armed bandit problems

Anderson, Christopher M. - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 72 (2012) 1, pp. 15-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009513987

Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

Anderson, Christopher M.; Camerer, Colin - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 16 (2000) 3, pp. 689-718

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001526158

Modeling effort and lobbying in a heterogeneous common pool resource setting

Freeman, Matthew A.; Anderson, Christopher M. - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 56 (2013) 3, pp. 399-414

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207825

A game-theoretic analysis of competition among container port hubs : the case of Busan and Shanghai

Anderson, Christopher M.; Park, Yong-an; Chang, Young-tae; … - In: Maritime policy and management : MPM 35 (2008) 1, pp. 5-26

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003771783

The endogenous evolution of common property management systems

Wakamatsu, Mihoko; Anderson, Christopher M. - In: Ecological economics : the transdisciplinary journal of … 154 (2018), pp. 211-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994853

Uniform price mechanisms for threshold public goods provision with complete information : an experimental investigation

Li, Zhi; Anderson, Christopher M.; Swallow, Stephen K. - In: Journal of public economics 144 (2016), pp. 14-26

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011654759

Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games

Anderson, Christopher M.; Camerer, Colin - 2001

We apply Camerer and Ho's experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model of learning to extensive-form signaling games. Since these games often have many equilibria, logical 'refinements' have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur. Brandts and Holt conjectured that belief formation could...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014148781