Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: No Honor Among Thieves: The Prisoner’s Dilemma -- Chapter 3: The Players -- Chapter 4: Fool Me Once: The Information Set -- Chapter 5 -- Do Unto Others Cooperation in Games -- Chapter 6: A Stitch in Time Sequential Games -- Chapter 7: I Solemnly Swear...

This paper extends choice theory by allowing for the interaction between cognitive costs and imitative dynamics. The authors experimentally investigate the role of imitation when participants face a task which is costly in cognitive terms. In order to disentangle different choice dynamics, they...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...