countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset … of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The … small stable coalition is not very effec- tive in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The …

game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never … stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is …

game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never … stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is …

that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax …

that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax …

game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never … stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is …

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …