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Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853

Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2014

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169832

Interactive unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2005

The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini …-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366550

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317

Unawareness of Actions and Myopic Discovery Process in Simultaneous-Move Games with Unawareness

Tada, Yoshihiko - 2022

realizable CURB set, represent the economy of knowledge of games' structures …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296791

Policy Gradient Methods Find the Nash Equilibrium in N-player General-sum Linear-quadratic Games

Hambly, Ben M.; Xu, Renyuan; Yang, Huining - 2021

We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove convergence of the method we require a certain amount of noise in the system....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217478

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. -- Unawareness ; extensive-form games ; extensive-form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009542457

Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011

the procedure, for each information set of a player a surviving strategy of hers is required to be rational vis-a-vis a … belief system with a full-support belief on the opponents' previously surviving strategies that reach that information set … show that it yields the same, full information unraveling prediction as does the unique sequential equilibrium singled out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544217

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2009

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003878990

Rationalizable Outcome Distributions : A Markov Characterization

Veiel, Rafael; Gossner, Olivier - 2022

We study (interim correlated) rationalizability in a game with incomplete information. We characterize the recursive … parameterized class of information structures, Stationary Common Automaton Markov Priors (SCAMP), is sufficient to generate every … outcome distribution induced by general common prior information structures. Using this result, we characterize the set of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243353