We consider a war of attrition with stochastic deadlines in which the players can learn about the state that determines their payoffs at deadline. We study how the players' incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and what implications these incentives...

Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompasses most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model. We use this result to derive a...

We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the distribution of the underlying state, and the receiver takes an action after observing the signal and its...