Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

This paper presents results on the stability of the wage dispersion model presented in Mortensen (2003). Specifically, we test four "positive definite" learning processes on a single parameterisation of the underlying model, and submit the most successful to a thorough sensitivity analysis. The...

Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis of their equilibrium convergence properties is lacking....

We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

Economists tend to assume that agents maximize their expected utility. However, many different experiments have questioned expected utility maximization by showing that human behavior can be characterized as random. This paper proposes Thompson Sampling as a theory of human behavior across very...