-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached … by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non … existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …

algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game. …

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule …" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It … is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these …

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form costly undirected links anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming … are not even singularly pairwise stable. As an important implication, this reveals the diversity of possible bargaining …