Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323209
We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a novel strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587542
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035839
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927572
We analyze how the gender composition of teams affects team interactions. In an online experiment, we randomly assign individuals to gender-homogenous or gender-mixed teams. Teams meet in an audio chat room and jointly work on a gender-neutral team task. By design, effects on team performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014346452
Public goods provision often involves groups of contributors repeatedly interacting with administrators who can extract rents from the pool of contributions. We suggest a novel identification approach that exploits the sequential ordering of decisions in a panel vector autoregressive model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010484932
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486565
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012034550
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929025