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Intertemporal effort provision in sequential tournaments : conference paper

Klein, Arnd Heinrich; Schmutzler, Armin - 2013

This paper analyzes intertemporal effort provision in two-stage tournaments. A principal with a fixed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. He observes noisy signals of effort in both periods. His goal is to maximize either total efforts (perfect substitutes) or the product of first-...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338948

Electives shopping, grading competition, and grading norms

Gregor, Martin - 2018

) intensifies the competition: in particular, both top and mean realized scores increase. To tame incentives to provide excessively …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011914839

Performance responses to competition across skill-levels in rank order tournaments : field evidence and implications for tournament design

Boudreau, Kevin J.; Helfat, Constance E.; Lakhani, Karim R. - 2013

Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2,775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies non-monotonically across contestants of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010192352

Do tournaments with superstars encourage or discourage competition?

Babington, Michael; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Kitchens, Carl T. - 2017

To test and replicate the superstar effect reported by Brown (2011) we empirically study contests where a single entrant has an endogenously higher probability of winning. Unlike the previous literature, we test for the presence of the superstar effect in several different contexts. Ultimately,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647661

On the survival of payoff maximizing behavior and delegation in contests

Possajennikov, Alexandre (contributor) - 2008

that in two-player contests the optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize principal's payoff … while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from principal's payoff maximization. Further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790694

Grind or gamble? : an experimental analysis of effort and spread seeking in contests

Andersson, Ola; Holm, Håkan J.; Wengström, Erik - 2017

We conduct a contest experiment where participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory we observe substantial investments in spread. We find that both types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586585

Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments

Huang, Lingbo - 2017

I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950756

Adding Tournament to Tournament : Combining Between-Team and Within-Team Incentives

Majerczyk, Michael - 2018

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in … team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and … offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921253

Tournament Incentives in Professional Bowling

Bognanno, Michael L. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012881571

Observing your competitor : the role of effort information in two-stage tournaments

Ludwig, Sandra; Lünser, Gabriele K. - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 33 (2012) 1, pp. 166-182

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488935