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Sher, Itai - 2020

This paper develops the symmetric power order, a measure of voting power for multicandidate elections. The measure generalizes standard pivotality-based voting power measures for binary elections, such as Banzhaf power. At the same time, the measure is not based on pivotality, but rather on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112437

Chapter Twenty-Three. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness

Kotaro, Suzumura - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 605-685). 2011

Ever since Sen crystallized the logical conflict between the welfaristic value of the Pareto principle and the nonwelfaristic value of individual libertarian rights into what he christened the impossibility of a Paretian liberal , there have been many attempts in social choice theory to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025185

A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division

Fujinaka, Yuji - 2009

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212939

A Tale of Two Tails : Preferences of Neutral Third-Parties in Three-Player Ultimatum Games

Bosch-Rosa, Ciril - 2015

We present a new three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy profile of the neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158292

A general power index

Lojkine, Ulysse - 2022

I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ∆, has the following properties: (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083894

Bankruptcy Problems : On Rights Arbitration and Game Theory

de Mesnard, Louis - 2015

We examine ibn Ezra's procedure (Rabinovitch 1973; O'Neill 1982) historically used to solve the Rights Arbitration … procedure is a maximal game (Aumann 2010). However, when the greatest claim is smaller than the estate, the axioms of efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031630

Three Wives Problem and Shapley Value

de Mesnard, Louis - 2015

by Aumann and Maschler (1985) using coalitional procedure. This problem has many practical applications. In an attempt to … Shapley value in a “cumulative game”. It can be challenged because the coalitional procedure yields the same result as the … by Aumann and Maschler's coalitional procedure (i.e., the nucleolus or the Shapley value of the dual game), and how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031631

Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players

Neyman, Abraham - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2121-2167). 2002

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024489

A tale of two tails : preferences of neutral third-parties in three-player ultimatum games

Bosch-Rosa, Ciril - 2014 - First version: 13/2/2011, This Version: 31/10/2013

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy pro le of a neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the split...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413243

Give and you shall receive : the emergence of welfare-reducing reciprocity

Murray, Cameron K.; Frijters, Paul; Vorster, Melissa - 2015

We develop a new experiment to study the emergence of welfare-reducing bilateral alliances within larger groups, and the effectiveness of institutional interventions to curtail this reciprocal alliance behaviour. In each of the 25 rounds of our experiments, a player (the 'allocator') nominates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513328