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Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas

Marcin, Isabel; Robalo, Pedro; Tausch, Franziska - 2016

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455952

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off : An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea - 2021

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school ("Abiturbestenverfahren", "Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen") and on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324860

Telling the truth may not pay off : an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian (contributor); Dwenger, Nadja (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635151

The politics of bargaining as a group

Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter - 2023

We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014444047

Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games

Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009

We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202604

Existence and Efficiency of Nash Equilibria under Deterministic Voting

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2008

requires appropriate political institutions (maximum taxation constraint) …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216274

Institutional Endogeneity and Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas

Marcin, Isabel - 2019

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903425

Skewed norms under peer pressure : formation and collapse

Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel - 2014 - This version June 2014

This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374440

Separation of powers, political competition and efficient provision of public goods

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 03 September 2010, First Version: 28 September 2007

determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make … select institutions which restrict the power of politicians. iii) In conjunction with political competition, these … institutions implement the Lindahl allocation in the economy as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game. iv) As a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343846

Elite collective agency and the state

Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2019

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites' challenge is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst. The basic insight holds that the credibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967393