In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint …. To illustrate the general problem investigated in this paper, consider the following signaling situation: A corporate …

Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one …-shot games. We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of …

We find an effect of irrelevant information on adverse selection in a laboratory signaling game. This effect occurs via …

I develop a model of stochastic costly signaling in the presence of exogenous imperfect information, and study whether … equilibrium signaling decreases (‘information substitutes') or increases (‘information complements') if the accuracy of exogenous … information increases. A stochastic pure costly signaling model is shown to have a unique sequential equilibrium in which at least …