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Signal-jamming in the frequency domain

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Segmented risk sharing in a continuous-time setting

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Currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms

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On uniquely implementing cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma

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Segmented risk sharing in a continuous-time setting

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Currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms

Taub, Bart - In: International economic review 35 (1994) 4, pp. 921-956

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Segmented risk sharing in a continuous-time setting

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Probabilistic cheap talk

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Bargaining power in stationary parallelogram games

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Segmented Risk Sharing in a Continuous-Time Setting

Taub, Bart; Chade, Hector - 2000

In an economy with a continuum of individuals, each individual has a stochastic, continuously evolving endowment process. Individuals are risk averse and would therefore like to insure their endowment processes. It is feasible to obtain insurance by pooling endowments across individuals because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184308