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Electoral competition under media influence

Bräuer, Wolfgang - 1998

current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of … voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441433

Political awareness, microtargeting of voters, and negative electoral campaigning

Schipper, Burkhard; Hee Yeul Woo - 2017

We study the informational effectiveness of electoral campaigns. Voters may not think about all political issues and have incomplete information with regard to political positions of candidates. Nevertheless, we show that if candidates are allowed to microtarget voters with messages then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764917

Electoral competition under media influence

Bräuer, Wolfgang - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428394

On the Paradox of Mediocracy

Fu, Qiang; Li, Ming; Qiao, Xue - 2020

We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The … conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary … effects, the leader’s reputation concern has a beneficial effect by inducing the manager to supply productive effort and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014097189

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002071407

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156

A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives

Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-12

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613

Voting in three-alternative committees : an experiment

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/20, pp. 1-23

We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937

Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition

Beniers, Klaas Jan; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2005

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335188

Information in elections : do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?

Andina-Díaz, Ascensión - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 7 (2016) 3, pp. 307-339

We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two classes of voters: ideological, who are biased towards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537537