Similar Search Results

Trust and trustworthiness : theoretical explanations and experimental evidence

Engelmann, Dirk - 2000 - Als Ms. gedr.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001480659

Risk aversion pays in the class 2 x 2 games with no pure equilibrium

Engelmann, Dirk - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001818327

Asymmetric type recognition with applications to dilemma games

Engelmann, Dirk - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 52 (2001) 4, pp. 357-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001673959

How not to extend models of inequality aversion

Engelmann, Dirk - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 81 (2012) 2, pp. 599-605

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009626409

Long term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001389065

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001424938

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 10 (2003) 4, pp. 407-425

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001770217

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001757550

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 5 (2002) 1, pp. 5-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001698365

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472