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We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers … in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415279
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001788909
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215432
, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076140
I present a behavioural model of network formation with positive network externalities in which individuals have preferences for being part of a clique. The behavioural model leads to an associated supermodular (Topkis, 1979) normal form game. I show that the behavioural model converges to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919752
, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399
players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called non-essentiality and determine the set of stable … cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064613
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841729
spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186326
This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219136