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Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of ‘classical’ TU-games by assigning a real number to every ordered coalition being a permutation of any subset of the player set. Such generalized characteristic functions can be applied when the earnings or costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052805
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594108
The Reverse Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems applies the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) for ‘large’ amounts of the estate, while it applies the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule) for ‘small’ amounts of the estate. The CEA rule, respectively CEL rule, can be axiomatized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662531
There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028413
In this paper we describe the extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each of its successors. The second one is the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029186
Players that participate in a cooperative game with transferable utilities are assumed to be part of a permission structure being a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before they can cooperate. Thus a permission structure limits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060800
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities -or simply a TU-game. A value mapping for TU-games is a mapping that assigns to every game a set of vectors each representing a distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173499
A cooperative game with transferable utilities--or simply a TU-game--describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of payoffs over the players in the game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210608
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