Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...

Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...

We consider the Nash equilibrium existence problem for Cournotian games and we provide two results for it. The first is compatible with utility functions that are discontinuous at the origin, but requires the nonemptiness of best-replies at the origin (and in some sense is known); the second...

We examine the welfare properties, coalition-proofness and order-theoretical structure of the set of Nash equilibria in pure strategy games with a-aggregative simple strategic substitutes and monotone a-aggregative externalities. For these games, we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash...

Introduction -- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi -- Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses -- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment -- On the Geometric Structure of the...