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Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information

Metzger, Lars - 2015

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967

On cheating and whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290

On cheating and whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002346437

On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977

Common Agency with Informed Principals : Menus and Signals

Galperti, Simone - 2015

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126

Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals

Galperti, Simone - 2011

power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226

Communication games with optional verification

Schopohl, Simon - 2016

We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182

Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection

Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015

. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may … mechanism is in turn extendable to a mechanism implemented in partial truthful revelation of type. The restriction of design to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575

Informationally Simple Incentives

Gleyze, Simon - 2020

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as … others'. The choice of the mechanism generates informational incentives as it affects what information is acquired before … play begins. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844328

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012