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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006

Strategic incomplete contracts : theory and experiments

Erkal, Nisvan; Wu, Steven Y.; Roe, Brian - 2014

We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ; [1]

Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015

-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a … some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157

Empowerment and the dark side of delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Gift exchange in the workplace

Dur, Robert A. J. - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377053

Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2012

make the returns to reputation non-linear. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183448

Explicit and Implicit Incentives for Multiple Agents

Glover, Jonathan C. - 2014

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064724