We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability...

We consider non-cooperative multilateral bargaining games with endogenous bargaining protocols. Under an endogenous protocol, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is...

At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes-vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and...

It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty....

We study subgame φ-maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here φ denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame φ-maxmin strategies are strategies...

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...