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Some play fair, some don't : reciprocal fairness in a stylized principal-agent problem

Höffler, Felix - 1997

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10000988341

Some play fair, some don't reciprocal fairness in a stylized principal-agent problem

Höffler, Felix - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 38 (1999) 1, pp. 113-131

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10001387870

Mobile termination and collusion, revisited

Höffler, Felix (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003395116

Mobile termination and collusion, revisited

Höffler, Felix - In: Journal of regulatory economics 35 (2009) 3, pp. 246-274

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003861898

Internal incentive schemes and "strategic positions"

Höffler, Felix; Sliwka, Dirk - 2010 - Preliminary [version], February 2010

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008909177

Mobile Termination and Collusion, Revisited

Höffler, Felix - 2006

The standard model by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) treats termination fees as an instrument to increase market power in a one-shot game of horizontal product differentiation. We offer an alternative view in an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition. We focus on symmetrical calling patterns...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014056294