Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior …

This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean …-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of … JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes. Some of our learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments with human subjects have …

the prevalence of their own values and preferences when forming beliefs about others' values and preferences, depends on … the salience of own preferences. We manipulate salience by varying the order of elicitation of preferences and beliefs …

version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about …We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection … uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs. …

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects’ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players … their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject’s true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits …