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Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games

Martimort, David - 2014

there are two distinct sources of inefficiencies: inefficient contracting by a given coalition of active principals and … illustrated by means of two games: a public goods game in which each player simultaneously offers a menu contract to a common …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058753

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012

Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines : the role of commitment

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756012

Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal

Sun, Yiman - 2018

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065

A Theory of Threshold Contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013

We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal-agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government-public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152779

Renegotiation in public-private partnerships : an incentive mechanism approach

Russo, Julio Cezar; Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães; … - In: Group decision and negotiation 27 (2018) 6, pp. 949-979

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943685

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility : An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility of the outcome plays a crucial role when effort is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105234

Complete contracts under incomplete information

Curello, Gregorio; Lyu, Qianjun; Zhang, Yimeng - 2024

We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135462