not onlymutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examinewhether players are …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract …

, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper … explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are …

The relationship between trust and risk is a topic of enduring interest. Although there are substantial differences … in the widely-used "trust game" actually measure trust, or instead reveal more about risk attitudes. It is critical to … cogent evidence on the relationship between trust and risk in "trust" games. Subjects in our experiment participate either in …