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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

Reciprocity, self-interest and reputation: debt vs equity contracts

Shah, Syed Munawar; Mariani Abdul Majid - In: Islamic economic studies 27 (2019) 1, pp. 53-64

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether reputation element affects the decision relative performance of … following lab experiments bonus-incentive treatment without reputation, bonus-incentive treatment with reputation and trust …-incentive treatment with reputation. Findings The study finds that the reputation and fairness concerns, in contrast to self-interest, may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012182130

Non-Adjudicatory State-State Mechanisms in Investment Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement : Joint Interpretations, Filters and Focal Points

Titi, Catharine - 2020

The last 30 years in the history of international investment law witnessed the emergence of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as the definitive method for the resolution of investment disputes, and the expanding role of the investor in the same. Investment dispute settlement has become...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853977

A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination.

Crettez, Bertrand; Deloche, Régis - In: Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and … 3 (2009) 2, pp. 123-139

In Rome, on 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro. They kept him a prisoner for 55 days, and ultimately killed him. Why did they decide to kill Moro since it appears a posteriori that they did not improve their situation by doing so? Our paper answers this question by building...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000427

The Poker-Litigation Game

Guerra-Pujol, F. E. - 2015

Is civil and criminal litigation a search for truth, like science or philosophy, or a game of skill and luck, like the game of poker? Although the process of litigation has been modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, as a War of Attrition, as a Game of Chicken, and even as a simple coin toss, no one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162342

Who is Afraid of Bayesian Persuasion?

Lauwers, Luc; Van Cayseele, Patrick J. G. - 2018

Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011) refers to the optimal signalling of a Sender with informational advantage over the Receiver, under the constraint that the expected posterior (over the state space) equals the common prior. In the basic example of a judicial system with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113405

Litigation Cost Strategies, Settlement Offers and Game Theory

Macey-Dare, Rupert - 2011

Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026078

Gambling for the upper hand : settlement negotiations in the lab

Miettinen, Topi; Ropponen, Olli; Sääskilahti, Pekka - 2011

We exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negotiations and the plaintiff's decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We find that greater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlement rate. This latter finding goes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008991286

Contests as selection mechanisms : the impact of risk aversion

March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2017

We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700456

Contests as selection mechanisms : the impact of risk aversion

March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011701971