We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

We report on a large experiment testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders: in the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder's minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share,...

We report on a large, pre-registered experiment testing the role of moral preferences in oneshot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. We measure moral preferences in two ways: through a decision problem with real economic consequences (the trade-off...

We report on a large, pre-registered, experiment testing the role of moral preferences in the ultimatum and the impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. We measure moral preferences in two ways: through a decision problem with real economic consequences (the trade-off game), and...