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Secessions and political extremism : why regional referenda do not solve the problem

Olofsgård, Anders - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2004) 5, pp. 805-832

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002233791

Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: a model for the selection and use of biased expert advice

Plott, Charles; Llewellyn, Morgan - In: European journal of political economy 40 (2015) 2, pp. 208-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011535685

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2013

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the … dieser Innovation durch jeden Experten erfolgt auf der Grundlage dessen, was in der gemeinsamen Disziplin als allgemein …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195361

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348129

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valsek, … - 2014

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356364

Voting with public information

Liu, Shuo - 2015

We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in a committee with members of both common and conflicting interests. We show that the set of preferences that allow for the existence of an informative voting equilibrium can be heavily restricted by the presence of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010512059