We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …

optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …

We explore how inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction interact in an optimal incentive system … rents can be used to provide incentives. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an employment … relationship early on, though, because of two reasons: first, preferences for reciprocity effectively reduce the employee's effort …

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …