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theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such liability problems. We establish three main monotonicity properties of …In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm … increase of the asset value. Even though liability games are constant-sum games and we show that the Shapley value can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210861
the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory … literature, we introduce the firm as an explicit player and define a new class of transferable utility games called liability … games. Liability games are superadditive, constant sum, partially convex, and partially concave. The core of a liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010994
A new model of TU game is introduced and studied. Here apart from the characteristic function, two additional functions are used: relations between the players and the probability of coalition formation. We suggest and study the sufficient properties of the probability function to transform it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102140
This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024489
We analyze a particular episode of a popular British TV game show, “Golden Balls,” in which one of the two contestants lied about what he intended to do, which had the salutary effect of inducing both contestants to cooperate in what is normally a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), wherein one or both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845380
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076141
We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018) still holds true even when the set of alternatives contains uncountably infinite elements
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913496
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242612
This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117753