Showing 1 - 10 of 23
Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488863
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555093
I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665739
A "conservation good" (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller does conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009764409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009712792
Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924561
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011650254
Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a theory of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012213175
The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224332
This article presents a sequence of simple and related models to analyze the strategic use of natural resources. Game theory is the natural tool for such an analysis, whether the resource is private or publicly owned, whether it is renewable or exhaustible, whether the game is static or dynamic,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098144