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We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player...
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It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the...
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This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036720
It is well-known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show...
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This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724830
The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, contains the Core and is included in the Zhou Bargaining Set, eliminating the "dominated" coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the Stable Demand Set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131626
This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability...
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