In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray when trusted. The...

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...

"In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the trusted player, called the temptee, has a temptation to betray. The strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to...

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...

A seller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now, while honest behavior results in higher reputation – and thus higher payments – in the future. We study two widely used classes of reputation...