We experimentally measure the ability of subjects to coordinate on issues related to the H1N1 influenza virus before and after an outbreak. Our instrument consists of an H1N1 survey converted into a coordination game. We show that the degree of coordination on beliefs about (1) H1N1 prevention,...

We experimentally test the ability of subjects to identify repeated-game strategies from prisoner's dilemma choice data. In the experiments, subjects use a finite state grammar to build models to fit game histories. The histories are designed to distinguish between strategies with empirical and...

We experimentally study behavior in a common property renewable resource extraction game with multiple equilibria. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract and consume a renewable resource in continuous time. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with...

We show that violations of demand theory are more numerous than previously reported in experimental two-player dictator games. We introduce a “weighted price” function that shows that violations of revealed preference can be interpreted as the dictator's insensitivity to the price of the...

In von Neumann and Morgenstern's sample model of poker, equilibrium has the first player bet with high and low hands, and check with intermediate hands.  The second player then calls if his hand is sufficiently high.  Betting by the low hands is interpreted as bluffing, and is a pure...