Managerial forecast disclosure has gained increasing interest. Besides voluntary publication, managers are more and more obliged to disclose forecasts by recent accounting regulation. This acknowledges the common proposition that forecasts were exceptionally relevant and decision useful...

The aim of auditing is to protect active and potential investors from accounting fraud. However, the large number of auditing scandals demonstrates that auditing has a dark side. This dark side of auditing is the topic of this paper. Correct auditing is a public good, provided by private...

We examine whether tax audit regimes become more efficient if (i) there are audited financial statements and (ii) tax auditors have access to the internal statutory audit report revealing information about statutory audit adjustments. Our analysis is based on a standard tax compliance game that...

We examine the strategic choice of peer comparables in fairness opinions (FOs) used in M&A valuations. Using a hand-collected sample of peer comparable analyses and a regulatory shock to appraisal lawsuit risk, we show that target-sought FOs employ lower-valued peers when litigation risk is...

We study the voting rules to modify, amend, and renegotiate syndicated loan contracts. We base our hypotheses on a model that shows how amendment thresholds can mitigate agency conflicts within the lending syndicate. Consistent with our model predictions, we find that voting rules are more...

I provide new evidence on the renegotiation of financial contracts using a comprehensive sample of over 90,000 debt contract renegotiations. I study whether the demand for monitoring determines the renegotiation intensity, defined as either the renegotiation frequency over a period of time or...

This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose...

We use data multinational firms provide to the Internal Revenue Service regarding their foreign subsidiary locations to explore whether some firms fail to publicly disclose subsidiaries in some countries, even when the subsidiaries are significant and should be disclosed per Security and...

We study voluntary disclosure strategies in leader-follower games where firms choose real actions sequentially after simultaneously disclosing information. We show that the leader incurs an endogenous consistency cost when withholding information because it must choose a suboptimal real action...