We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information available to the experimental subjects in a simple,...

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain...

Background: This paper develops a game theoretic model that analyses the dynamics of competition among the leading domestic aviation firms in the Nigerian aviation industry. It probes the abilities of the prisoner dilemma to describe the subjective behaviour of the firms, which provide a...

This paper provides a general overview of theories and tools to model individual and collective decision-making. In particular, stress is laid on the interaction of several decision-makers. A substantial part of this paper is devoted to utility maximization and its application to collective...

This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is...

In the first chapter of this book the basic results within convex and quasiconvex analysis are presented. In Section 2 we consider in detail the algebraic and topological properties of convex sets within Rn together with their primal and dual representations. In Section 3 we apply the results...

Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at law through the lens of probability theory: ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law'. But Holmes himself, and few others, have taken up this intriguing...

The question of how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first...

We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...