Similar Search Results

Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

Luz, Vitor Farinha - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1349-1391

's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744297

Overconfidence and timing of entry

Santos-Pinto, Luis; Pires, Tiago - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/44, pp. 1-19

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of … rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost …-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432306

Chapter 59 Strategic aspects of political systems

Banks, Jeffrey S. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2203-2228). 2002

Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognition of the importance of modeling institutional details in political processes. A sample of the literature on game-theoretic models of political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024486

Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; Deneckere, Raymond J. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1897-1945). 2002

A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024495

A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703

Black sheep and walls of silence

Mühlheuser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2005 - Revised version: June 2005, First version: July 2004

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ('black sheep') exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a 'wall of silence'). Much cited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371084

A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium

Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - 2014

Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870

When ignorance is bliss : information asymmetries enhance prosocial behavior in dictator games

Winschel, Evguenia; Zahn, Philipp - 2014

In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To assess the effect of information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342476

On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget

Kuzmics, Christoph; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2016

Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the utility from participating in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435962

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350