Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of...

Large, international banking groups have sought to centralise their cross-currency liquidity management: liquidity shortages in one currency are financed using liquidity surpluses in another currency. The nature of risks to financial stability emerging from global liquidity management depends on...

We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)'s 'anticipatory equilibrium' by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of competitors'...

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such "cursed" traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage distortions caused...

The moral hazard problem has been examined in the context of REITs (Edelstein, et al., 2010), securitized real estate (Fan, et al., 2006) and mortgage back securities (Keys, et al. 2009 and 2010; Kau, et al. 2012). Most past studies investigate moral hazard through managerial incentive, with little...

A mechanical rebalancing strategy, such as a monthly or quarterly reallocation towards fixed portfolio weights, is an active strategy. Winning asset classes are sold and losers are bought. During crises, when markets are often trending, this can lead to substantially larger drawdowns than a...

Investors have preferences for local companies, as well as companies in connected cities. We develop a novel approach to exploit the geographic connections of investor watched stocks to identify latent city-to-city connections that influence geographic investment preferences in China. We find...

We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment....