We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999]), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about the other one. The DM entertains Multiplier preferences...

We study a tournament/contest where the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The degree to which the most able contestants win (selection efficiency) is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two...

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

We combine network formation and information transmission in a simple model and predict that people reveal less information when talking to those with a different identity. Furthermore, individuals prefer to talk to people with the same identity when there is a greater incentive to collect...

We investigate the role of conflicting interests in a boundedly rational model of belief dynamics. Individuals have different preferences about the action to take, are subject to persuasion bias and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in a social network. They communicate strategically...

This paper analyses a simultaneous game of network formation and information acquisition where the benefit structure is such that the benefit that an agent derives from the network she is located in depends on the maximum information that someone in her neighbourhood, including herself,...

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We...

This paper develops a model where players acquire information personally or by forming connections and the benefits that reach them depend only on the maximum of the information collected personally or by neighbours. As long as only direct connections matter periphery sponsored star is the only...

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...

I study a bounded rationality model of opinion formation in which there are two different types of agents: naive agents and sophisticated agents. All agents update their opinions by taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. Naive agents truthfully report their opinions, but sophisticated...