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A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591676
We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560695
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672526
In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...
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Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174138
We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176923
The ultimatum game models social exchange in situations in which the rational motive to maximize gains conflicts with fairness considerations. Using two independent behavioral measurements, the authors tested two contradicting predictions: that the preference for fairness is a deliberative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181014