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altruism or their income. We argue that, rather than signaling income per se, individuals may want to signal other unobservable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932726
strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529
Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. These cold openings provide a natural setting to apply laboratory-developed models of limited strategic thinking to the field. In a set of 1303 widely released movies, cold opening is correlated with a 10-30 percent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102319
We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532198
A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction with announced reserve price. The choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers. We characterize the equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064734
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941691
This paper considers price competition in a duopoly with quality uncertainty. The established firm (the `incumbent') offers a quality that is publicly known; the other firm (the `entrant') offers a new good whose quality is not known by some consumers. The incumbent is fully informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781393
known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling …, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121803
incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … quality of the asset, depending on the cost structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145542