In the current mobile world, repeated relationships ("communities") must be self-sustained. We formulate a framework in which some or all players strategically choose whether to terminate or repeat an N-person game. A dynamic game ends when a certain number of players choose termination. To...

There is a widespread hope that, in the near future, algorithms become so sophisticated that ``solutions" to most problems are found by machines. In this note, we throw some doubts on this expectation by showing the following impossibility result: given a set of finite-memory, finite-iteration...

Theoretical literature on collusion has focused on a specific formulation of payoff fluctuations, namely by demand shocks, and showed that payoff fluctuations are bad for collusion. Introducing general payoff fluctuations, we show that (i) payoff fluctuations may strictly reduce the minimum...

We analyze a noncooperative dynamic game of group formation with group reputation. It is inspired by observations of "name adoption" patterns in some retail markets. Firms are partitioned into name groups, or affiliation networks, in each period. In a group, all firms share the same group...

In the current mobile world, repeated relationships must be self-sustained by the members. We extend the framework of infinitely repeated games to incorporate the possibility that the game is strategically terminated by players. Specifically, we add a voting stage at the beginning of each period...

In the current mobile world, repeated relationships (communities) must be self-sustained by its members. We formulate a framework in which some or all players strategically choose whether to repeat an N-person game or to terminate it. This dynamic game ends when a certain number of players...