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Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of economic theory 89 (1999) 2, pp. 165-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001436015
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Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent
Celentani, Marco; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; … - 1995 - Rev
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000920334
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How irrational are subjects in extensive-form games?
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000927104
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Consistency and cautious fictitious play
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000927113
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When are non-anonymous players negligible?
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000927114
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Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000946216
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Limit games and limit equilibria
Fudenberg, Drew - In: Journal of economic theory 38 (1986) 2, pp. 261-279
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001009670
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When are nonanonymous players negligible?
Fudenberg, Drew - In: Journal of economic theory 79 (1998) 1, pp. 46-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001237012
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Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001369816
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Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information
Fudenberg, Drew - In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, (pp. 73-98). 1985
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001260238