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A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309
We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011867640
Two players can make use of a trusted third party who mediates and partially resolves their conflict. Usually, the mediator should be aware of the situation and give suggestions to the players accordingly. However, a corrupt mediator can have a big influence on the outcome of the game. We single...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560827
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
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Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with...
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We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128960
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432