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Anderton, Charles H.; Carter, John R. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 1211-1258). 2007

Peace economics can be defined as the use of economics to understand the causes and effects of violent conflict in the … peace economics, highlighting seminal as well as current contributions. Particularly noteworthy among the newer developments … relatively large cross-country panels. The topics surveyed include: the relation of peace economics to both defense economics and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024394

A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination.

Crettez, Bertrand; Deloche, Régis - In: Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and … 3 (2009) 2, pp. 123-139

In Rome, on 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro. They kept him a prisoner for 55 days, and ultimately killed him. Why did they decide to kill Moro since it appears a posteriori that they did not improve their situation by doing so? Our paper answers this question by building...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000427

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2012

In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422084

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Hausken, Kjell - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647311

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2010

Hausken (2008a) formulates a contest-theoretic model of the attack and defense of a network of targets. This note identies a technical error that invalidates Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space that he examines and provides necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646757

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Hausken, Kjell - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674264

Terrorism, Bargaining, and Credible Commitments

Young, Joseph K.; Findley, Michael - 2014

What explains the variation in terrorism within and across political regimes? We contend that terrorism is most likely to occur in contexts in which governments cannot credibly restrain themselves from abusing their power in the future. We consider a specific institutional arrangement, whether a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200285

Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists : The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory

Phillips, Peter J. - 2014

This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014143820

Chapter 25 Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Sandler, Todd; Arce, Daniel G. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 775-813). 2007

wings of a terrorist group. Game-theoretic notions also inform about interdependent security choices where the safety …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024404

Chapter 23 Civil War

Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 711-739). 2007

Civil wars are intricate social, political and psychological phenomena. However, economics can offer analytical insights which are useful alongside the more conventional approach of case-studies. Indeed, the policy conclusions drawn from economic analysis sometimes cast doubt on conventional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024406